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Abstract
The use of orthogonal signaling schemes such as time-, frequency-, or code-division multiplexing
(T-, F-, CDM) in multi-user systems allows for power-efficient simple receivers. It is shown in this paper
that by using orthogonal signaling on frequency selective fading channels, the cooperative Nash bar-
gaining (NB)-based precoding games for multi-user systems, which aim at maximizing the information
rates of all users, are simplified to the corresponding cooperative resource allocation games. The latter
provides additional practically desired simplifications to transmitter design and significantly reduces the
overhead during user cooperation. The complexity of the corresponding precoding/resource allocation
games, however, depends on the constraints imposed on the users. If only spectral mask constraints
are present, the corresponding cooperative NB problem can be formulated as a convex optimization
problem and solved efficiently in a distributed manner using dual decomposition based algorithm.
However, the NB problem is non-convex if total power constraints are also imposed on the users.
In this case, the complexity associate with finding the NB solution is unacceptably high. Therefore, the
multi-user systems are categorized into bandwidth- and power-dominant based on a bottleneck resource,
and different manners of cooperation are developed for each type of systems for the case of two-users.
Such classification guarantees that the solution obtained in each case is Pareto-optimal and actually can
be identical to the optimal solution, while the complexity is significantly reduced. Simulation results
demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed cooperative precoding/resource allocation strategies and the
reduced complexity of the proposed algorithms.
Index Terms: Cooperative games, multi-user systems, Nash bargaining, dual decomposition,
Pareto-optimality, spectral mask constraints, total power constraints.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In multi-user systems, all users compete for resources and can cause interference to each
other. This makes it impossible for any user to gain more profit without harming other users.
The traditional information-theoretic studies of multi-user systems are mainly focused on finding
the corresponding rate regions and do not advise how to actually achieve the best rates for all
users simultaneously (see [1]– [4] and the references therein). It is, however, evident that the
performance of multi-user systems depends on the balance among the users in the competition
for resources. Moreover, the points in the achievable rate region are not all stable, or even
feasible if the selfish nature of the users is taken into account. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume
that all users will compete for the maximum achievable benefits at all times, which may render
difficulties to the implementation of any prescribed regulations against the selfishness of users.
For example, although an outcome corresponding to the case when one user is forced to sacrifice
its performance for the benefit of other users can be theoretically justified, it is hard to make
sure in practice that the sacrificed user will not deviate from the regulation which is unfair for
him.
Recently, game theory has been recognized as an appropriate tool for studying multi-user
systems [5]– [20]. It studies the actions of decision makers (players, here wireless users) with
conflicting objectives, and predicts the users’ decisions on future actions (strategies) and the
outcome of the game. If users compete with each other, the existence of “stable” outcomes,
corresponding to the so-called equilibria, can be analyzed [8]– [10]. On the other hand, if there
is a voluntary cooperation among users, the extra benefits for all users can be obtained. The
corresponding games are called cooperative games and one of the most popular approaches
developed for cooperative games is the Nash bargaining (NB) approach [21].
Although the use of cooperative game theory to recourse allocation in multi-user wireless
systems is a recent research topic, there are some results available. A two-user power allocation
game on a flat fading channel (FFC) is investigated in [13]. It is argued that certain points in the
utility space of the game (i.e., the information-theoretic rate region of the multi-user system) are
not achievable from a game-theoretic perspective. It is also shown that the NB solution based
on time division multiplexing (TDM) increases the benefits of all users as compared to the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) solution. The study is extended in [14] to N-user systems with
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3frequency selective fading channels (FSFCs) for the case when only spectral mask constraints
(SMCs) are imposed on the users. The NB solution is derived based on joint TDM/frequency
division multiplexing (TDM/FDM) scheme. Unlike the FFC case, the allocation of frequency
bins becomes a major problem on the FSFC. A more complex resource allocation game on the
FSFC with only total power constraints (TPCs) limiting the total transmission power of each user
is considered in [15]. A water-filling based algorithm is proposed to search for the NB solution
in a two-user version of the game. The proposed algorithm bargains in many different convex
subspaces of the original utility space and obtains one NB solution in each subspace. Then, the
NB solution with the largest outcome is selected. However, the TPCs render the complexity of
the algorithm high.
One more application area of cooperative game theory is beamforming in multiple-input single-
output (MISO) systems [16]– [20]. A two-user game on interference channel is investigated in
[16], where user strategies are defined as the choices of beamforming vectors. The superiority
of the cooperative NB solution over the non-cooperative NE solution is demonstrated, and some
special points such as sum-rate and zero-forcing points are shown to be unstable from a game-
theoretic viewpoint. Kalai-Smorodinsky-type solutions of cooperative beamforming games are
further derived in [18]. For the games on two-user MISO systems, it is also shown in [19] and
[20] that any Pareto-optimal point in the game’s utility space can be realized through a certain
balance between competition and cooperation among the users.
Game theory has been also used for precoding design. A non-cooperative precoding game is
analyzed in [9] under SMCS and TPCs, in which a multi-user FSFC is considered and the optimal
precoding matrices are derived based on the NE. It is shown that the matrix-valued precoding
games boil down to equivalent vector-valued power allocation games, and the resulted precoding
matrices adopt a diagonal structure.1 The existence and uniqueness of the NE is guaranteed if the
communication links are sufficiently far away from each other, and the NE is more efficient when
the interference power is relatively low as compared to the noise power. Although non-cooperative
games do not coordinate users and, therefore, allow for low-complexity and distributed solutions,
they often lead to quite inefficient results for all users due to the lack of coordination.
1The precoding matrices were mistakenly expressed in [9] as a product of the inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) matrices
and power allocation diagonal matrices, while they should be expressed only as power allocation diagonal matrices.
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4In this paper, we develop cooperative NB-based precoding strategies for the multi-user wireless
systems using cooperative game theory.2 The main contribution of this paper is threefold. First,
it is shown that cooperative precoding games boil down to cooperative resource allocation games
under orthogonal signaling set up, that is, the TDM-based cooperation among users for FFCs or
the TDM/FDM-based cooperation for FSFCs. The precoding matrices adopt a strictly diagonal
structure in these cases. Second, we show that the process of bargaining among users can be
physically realized in a distributed and efficient manner with very low information overhead
if only SMCs are imposed on the users. Third, efficient algorithms for the precoding/resourse
allocation games are developed for the case when both SMCs and TPCs are imposed on the
users. Although the bargaining problem appears to be non-convex, efficient algorithms are
designed based on a proposed classification of the multi-user systems into bandwidth- and
power-dominant. Then, different manners of cooperation are developed for each type of the
systems. Such classification guarantees that the solution obtained for each type of the systems is
Pareto-optimal and actually can be identical to the optimal solution. Moreover, the complexity
is significantly reduced as compared to the complexity required for solving the original problem
using exact algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The signal model is introduced and the coop-
erative precoding/resource allocation game is formulated in Section II. The precoding/resource
allocation strategies for cooperative games with SMCs are studied in Section III. Section IV
deals with the two-user games with both SMCs and TPCs. Section V demonstrates our sim-
ulation results. It is followed by Section VI that concludes the paper. All proofs for Sec-
tions II, III, and IV are summarized in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively. This paper is
reproducible research [25] and the software needed to generate the numerical results can be
obtained from www.ece.ualberta.ca/∼vorobyov/ ProgNB.zip.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRECODING/RESOURSE ALLOCATION GAME FORMULATION
A. System model
Consider an M-user wireless system in which all users transmit on the same wideband FSFC
with channel length L where L depends on the channel delay spread and the signal symbol
2Some preliminary results without proofs have been reported in [22], [23], and submitted [24].
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5duration [27].3 Assuming block transmission with block length N for all users, the general
signal model for user i can be written as
yi = GiHiiFisi + Gi
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
HjiFjsj + Gini (1)
where si is the N × 1 information symbol block of user i, Fi is the N ×N precoding matrix of
user i, Gi is the N × N decoding matrix of user i, Hji is the N ×N channel matrix between
users j and i, ni is the N × 1 zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise vector with covariance
E{ninHi } = σ2i I, σ2i is the variance of si, and (·)H , E{·}, and I stand for the Hermitian transpose,
expectation operation, and identity matrix, respectively. The information symbols are assumed
to have unit-energy and be uncorrelated to each other and to noise, i.e., E{sisHi } = I and
E{sinHi } = 0, where 0 denotes the matrix of zeros.
In order to decompose a wideband FSFC to flat fading frequency bins, orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) is adopted. Specifically, assuming that the block length N is
larger than the channel length L, introducing cyclic prefix (CP), and performing IFFT and fast
Fourier transform (FFT) at the transmitter and receiver sides, respectively, the signal model can
be written as [9], [26], [27]
yi = GiΦiiFisi + Gin˜i (2)
where n˜i =
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
ΦjiFjsj + Dni is the N × 1 interference plus noise vector of user i before
the decoder, D is the FFT matrix, Φji is the N ×N diagonalized channel matrix between users
j and i with its kth element being the sampled frequency response of the kth frequency bin.
Both the desired communication channel Hii and the interference channels Hji (∀j, j 6= i)
are diagonalized due to the CP insertion and the multiplication by matrices DH and D at the
transmitter and receiver sides, respectively.
Considering the general case when all users treat the interference as additive noise, the noise
covariance for user i before the decoder can be expressed as
R−i = E{n˜in˜Hi } = σ2i I +
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
ΦjiFjFHj ΦHji . (3)
3FFC can be viewed as FSFC with L = 1.
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6Then, the Wiener filter is the optimal capacity-lossless linear receiver [28], [29]. Thus, the
decoding matrix Gi can be found as
Gi = FHi HHii (HiiFiFHi HHii + R−i)−1 (4)
and the mutual information (information rate) that user i can achieve is expressed as [30]
Ri(Fi,F−i) = log
(
det
(
I + FHi ΦHii R−1−iΦiiFi
)) (5)
where F−i is the set of the precoding matrices of all users except user i and det(·) denotes the
determinant.
In practice, all users attempt to maximize their information rates under certain power con-
strains. For the case of FSFC, SMCs are usually considered to limit the powers that the users can
allocate on different frequency bin. These power limits are denoted as pmaxi (k) (∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈
ΩN ) where ΩM = {1, · · · ,M} is the set of user indexes, ΩN == {1, · · · , N} is the set of
frequency bin indexes. Although SMCs also bound the total power by the value
∑
k∈ΩN
pmaxi (k)
for user i, such bound may be loose compared to possibly imposed total power limit Pmaxi .
Thus, TPCs may also be needed. The aforementioned SMCs and TPCs can be mathematically
expressed, correspondingly, as
E{|[Fisi]k|2} = [FiFHi ]kk ≤ pmaxi (k), ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN (6)
E{‖Fisi‖2} = Tr{FiFHi } ≤ Pmaxi , ∀i ∈ ΩM (7)
where [·]kk and Tr{·} denotes the kth diagonal element and the trace of a square matrix.
B. Cooperative Precoding/Resourse Allocation Game
Considering the wireless users as players, the choices of precoding matrices as user strategies,
and the corresponding information rates Ri’s as user utilities, the game model of the precoding
problem can be written as
Γ =
{
ΩM , {Fi | i ∈ ΩM}, {Ri(Fi,F−i) | i ∈ ΩM}
}
. (8)
In the non-cooperative case, when the game players (wireless users) do not collaborate, the NE
is a stable strategy combination of the game that satisfies
Ri(FNEi ,FNE−i ) ≥ Ri(F′i,FNE−i ), ∀F′i, ∀i ∈ ΩM (9)
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7where FNEi is the precoding strategy of user i in the NE, FNE−i is the combination of precoding
strategies of all users except user i in the NE, and F′i stands for any possible precoding strategy
for user i.
In the cooperative scenario, all users are willing to cooperate with each other and agree on a
common principle in sharing the resources. If the users choose the NB approach as a cooperation
principle, they aim at maximizing the Nash function (NF) defined in the cooperative utility space
(rate region) as [31]
F =
∏
i∈ΩM
(Ri(Fi,F−i)− R′i) (10)
where R′i is the information rate (the utility) that user i can achieve in the predefined disagreement
point which the users will resort to if the cooperation breaks up.
In the NB game, the users need to specify also a manner of cooperation according to which the
bargaining is performed. It is required that a particular manner of cooperation results in a convex
utility space. In the literature, the users are assumed to cooperate with each other using orthogonal
signaling schemes such as TDM for FFCs and joint TDM/FDM for FSFCs [13]– [15]. It allows
no interference among the users. The main technical reason for considering orthogonal signaling
is that the rate region of a general interference channel is yet unknown. Moreover, the use of
orthogonal signaling allows for power-efficient simple receives, while it is indeed reasonable
to assume that the users are equipped with simple matched-filter-based receivers. In addition,
if the users are allowed to interfere with each other, they need to exchange the interference
information to achieve a desirable performance. It may significantly increase the overhead in the
system as well as it also significantly complicates the transceiver design. Therefore, orthogonal
signaling is indeed a reasonable choice which is also adopted here. It is worth mentioning,
however, that orthogonal signaling may be inefficient when the interference among the users is
low [32]. In this case, the resulted rate region may be a small subset of the actual rate region.
However, it is proved in [32] that the cooperative bargaining problem becomes convex even
without orthogonal signaling when the interference among users is small (as compared to the
channel noise), which renders the problem simpler in this case. Moreover, the NE solution has a
satisfactory performance in the low-interference situation, and cooperation may not be the best
choice in this case considering the price paid for coordinating the users [9], [10]. Therefore, we
focus on the case of high-interference in which orthogonal signaling schemes are efficient, i.e.,
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8the cooperative solutions based on orthogonal signaling achieves better performance than the
non-cooperative solutions.
It has been shown in [9] that the non-cooperative precoding game can be simplified to a power
allocation game under orthogonal signaling. The following theorem shows that the cooperative
precoding game can be also simplified to a resource allocation game if orthogonal signaling is
used, i.e., TDM is used in the case of FFCs or joint TDM/FDM is used in the case of FSFCs.
Theorem 1: If the cooperation among users is based on orthogonal signaling, the precoding
matrix of each user in the cooperative precoding game (8) which maximize the NF (10) under
the constraints (6) and optionally (7) adopts a strictly diagonal structure.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. In order to maximize the utilities of all users in
the cooperative precoding game, the users must adjust their precoding matrices to achieve the
following two tasks: (i) coordinating the utilization of frequency bins (the public resources);
(ii) allocating powers (the individual user resources) across the frequency bins. Therefore, the
cooperative precoding game is more complex compared to the non-cooperative precoding game of
[9] where the game is solved by performing only individual power allocations among frequency
bins.
For further developments, two general assumptions need to be made: (i) The channel infor-
mation of the desired channel Hii is known at both the transmitter and receiver sides of user i
only; (ii) The TPCs are tight when they are taken into account, i.e., Pmaxi <
∑
k∈ΩN
pmaxi (k).
III. COOPERATIVE PRECODING/RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAMES WITH SMCS
The following NB precoding/resource allocation problem with only SMCs is considered
max
Fi,∀i∈ΩM
∏
i∈ΩM
(Ri(Fi,F−i)−R′i) subject to: [FiFHi ]kk ≤ pmaxi (k), ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN . (11)
A. Cooperative strategies for two-user game
The cooperative NB precoding/recourse allocation game (11) is first considered for two-users
only, i.e., M = 2 and ΩM = Ω2. Any stable point in the utility region can be selected as a
disagreement point. Since the NE point given by [9]
FNEi =
√
diag(pmaxi ), ∀i ∈ Ω2 (12)
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9is stable, it can be selected as a disagreement point. In (12), pmaxi = [pmaxi (1), . . . , pmaxi (N)]T is
the N × 1 vector of power limits on different frequency bins, i.e., the spectral mask vector, and
(·)T and diag(·) stand for the transpose and the operator that forms a square diagonal matrix
by writing the elements of a vector in the main diagonal, respectively. It can be seen from (12)
that each user exploits maximum allowed power on all frequency bins to maximize its rate.
Knowing the disagreement point, the manner of cooperation between users can be chosen as
the joint TDM/FDM for FSFCs (see the arguments in the previous section). The joint TDM/FDM
prescribes that any frequency bin can be used by only one user at any time instant, but it may be
shared by different users throughout the operation time. The joint TDM/FDM can be implemented
with low complexity and the corresponding rate region is guaranteed to be convex.
The following theorem about the structure of the optimal precoding matrices of the two-user
TDM/FDM cooperative game (11) on FSFCs is in order.
Theorem 2: The NB-based precoding/resource allocation optimal strategies for the two-
user TDM/FDM-based cooperative precoding/resource allocation game (11) on the FSFCs are
obtained through time sharing of at most two sets of diagonal precoding matrices denoted as
{F11,F12} and {F21,F22}. The following conditions must be satisfied
[Fli]kk ∈ {0,
√
pmaxi (k)}, ∀i, ∀k, ∀l; Fl1Fl2 = 0, ∀l;
(
Tr{F1i − F2i }
)2 ∈ Pi, ∀i (13)
where i ∈ Ω2, l ∈ Ω2, k ∈ ΩN , and Pi = {pmaxi (k) | k ∈ ΩN} is the set of power limits for
user i.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 states that the joint TDM/FDM-based cooperation on N frequency bins can be
realized by the time sharing of two diagonal precoding matrices under SMCs. It can be also
seen from the proof of Theorem 2 (see Appendix B) that only one frequency bin needs to
be shared. Denote this frequency bin as k⋆ and assume that [F11]k⋆k⋆ =
√
pmax1 (k
⋆). Therefore,
[F21]k⋆k⋆ = [F12]k⋆k⋆ = 0 and [F22]k⋆k⋆ =
√
pmax2 (k
⋆). Assuming that user 1 shares frequency bin k⋆
for α portion of time (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), the information rate of user i ∈ Ω2 can be written as
Ri=α log
(
det
(
I + (F
1
i )
H
Φ
H
iiΦiiF1i
σ2i
))
+(1− α) log
(
det
(
I + (F
2
i )
H
Φ
H
iiΦiiF2i
σ2i
))
. (14)
Therefore, the two-user cooperative NB precoding/recourse allocation game (11) with the joint
TDM/FDM cooperation scheme can be converted to the problem of finding k⋆ and α and be
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simplified as follows. The information rate for user i given in (14) is the summation of user i’s
information rates on all frequency bins, and thus, can be rewritten as
Ri =
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)Ri(k), ∀i ∈ Ω2 (15)
where Ri(k) = log(1 + |Φii(k)|2pmaxi (k)/σ2i ) is the information rate that user i obtains on fre-
quency bin k by using it exclusively for all times, and αi(k) is the time portion during which the
frequency bin k is allocated to user i. Note that in the NB solution of the game, 0 < αi(k) < 1
(i ∈ Ω2) hold only for k = k⋆. Then, taking the logarithm of the NF, the NB solution can be
found by solving the following convex optimization problem
max
αi(k), i∈ΩM ,k∈ΩN
log(R1 − RNE1 ) + log(R2 −RNE2 )
subject to: 0 ≤ αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Ω2, ∀k ∈ ΩN
α1(k) + α2(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ ΩN ; Ri > RNEi , ∀i ∈ Ω2 (16)
where RNEi is the rate that user i obtains based on the NE solution. It is worth noting that the
last constraint in (16) guarantees that both users can achieve higher rates than RNEi (i ∈ Ω2)
through the joint TDM/FDM-based cooperation. Otherwise the users resort to the disagreement
point and the cooperation breaks up.
B. Cooperative strategies for M-user game
Unlike the two-user case, where the NB solution of the cooperative precoding/resource alloca-
tion game can be formulated as a time sharing between two sets of precoding matrices, it is much
more complex to coordinate the users’ precoding matrices in the M-user game. The structure
used for the two-user game can not be directly applied here, especially when the number of
users is large. Therefore, to solve the M-user game, we first partition time into time slots each
of length T to make it easier for the users to perform time sharing. Moreover, considering the
case when the number of users or the channel states change over time, the time partitioning
enables a timely update of the bargaining solution as long as time slots are small enough. In this
case, the cooperative solution can be obtained through the procedure summarized in Table I. In
the following we focus on the second step of the procedure in Table I.
As an extension of Theorem 2, the following theorem is in order.
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TABLE I
PROCEDURE FOR FINDING COOPERATIVE SOLUTION IN AN M -USER GAME.
1. Initialization: the NE solution for the precoding matrices is obtained and the NE point is used as a
disagreement point.
2. Computation: the cooperative NB solution for the precoding matrices is calculated.
3. Implementation: Implement the NB solution for one time slot. If any changes of the number of users or the
channel states are detected during this time slot, go back to step 1 in the next slot; otherwise, repeat step 3.
Theorem 3: Precoding matrices corresponding to the NB solution of the TDM/FDM-based
M-user cooperative game on the FSFCs have the form
Fi = Γi(t)
√
diag(pmaxi ), ∀i ∈ ΩM (17)
where Γi(t) is a diagonal matrix with its kth diagonal element
[Γi(t)]kk =

 1, if t ∈ [bi(k), ei(k)]0, if t /∈ [bi(k), ei(k)] (18)
with bi(k) and ei(k) representing, respectively, the starting and ending time moments between
which frequency bin k is allocated to user i in a time slot [0, T ]. The following conditions are
then satisfied ∑
i∈ΩM
Γi(t) = I; Γi(t)Γj(t) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ ΩM , j 6= i (19)
where t ∈ [0, T ] is the time instant in a current time slot.
The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and is omitted here. It is
worth noting, however, that the difference is that unlike the two-user game in which at most one
frequency bin needs to be shared, different groups of users may share different frequency bins
in the M-user game. The first condition in (19) states that no frequency bin should be vacant at
any time, while the second condition in (19) requests that no frequency bin be used by more than
one user at any time. Moreover, it is the length of [bi(k), ei(k)], denoted as αi(k) = ei(k)−bi(k),
rather than the specific values of bi(k) and ei(k), that affects the rates of the users. Once the time
portions αi(k) (∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN ) are fixed, the order of using frequency bins is not important
to the users. Thus, the key problem is to calculate the time portions αi(k) (∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩM)
that user i obtains on a frequency bin k. Mathematically, this problem can be formulated as the
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following optimization problem
max
αi(k), i∈ΩM ,k∈ΩN
∑
i∈ΩM
log(Ri − RNEi )
subject to: 0 ≤ αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN∑
i∈ΩM
αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ ΩN ; Ri > RNEi , ∀i ∈ ΩM (20)
where Ri is the sum of information rates that user i obtains on all frequency bins, that is,
Ri =
∑
k∈ΩN
log
(
1 +
|Φii(k)Fii(k)|2
σ2i
)
=
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k) log
(
1 +
|Φii(k)|2pmaxi (k)
σ2i
)
. (21)
To avoid a centralized channel estimation and information exchange overhead among users
on the cooperation stage, a distributed algorithm for solving (20) is developed next.
C. Distributed algorithm for finding the NB solution
The problem (20) is a convex optimization problem with a coupling constraint. Therefore, it
can be solved in a distributed manner using the dual decomposition method.
The Lagrange dual problem to (20) is given as
max
αi(k), i∈ΩM ,k∈ΩN
∑
i∈ΩM
log(Ri − RNEi )−
∑
k∈ΩN
λ(k)
(∑
i∈ΩM
αi(k)− 1
)
subject to: 0 ≤ αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN
Ri > R
NE
i , ∀i ∈ ΩM ; λ(k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ ΩN (22)
where λ(k) (∀k ∈ ΩN ) are the positive Lagrange multipliers.
The problem (22) can be further converted into a two-level optimization problem with the
following lower level subproblems
max
αi(k), k∈ΩN
log(Ri −RNEi )−
∑
k∈ΩN
λ(k)αi(k)
subject to: 0 ≤ αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ ΩN , Ri > RNEi (23)
for each user i ∈ ΩM , and the higher level master problem
min
λ(k), k∈ΩN
∑
i∈ΩM
Ui(λ) +
∑
k∈ΩN
λ(k) subject to: λ(k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ ΩN (24)
where Ui(λ) is the maximum value of the objective function in (23) given λ = [λ(1), . . . ,
λ(N)]T .
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The dual problem (23)–(24) can be solved based on a distributed structure with a coordinator.
Since the original problem is convex, strong duality holds and the solutions of the dual problem
(22) and the original problem (20) are the same if Slater’s condition is satisfied [33]. For our
specific problem, we have the following result.
Theorem 4: The Slater’s condition is guaranteed to be satisfied for the problem (20) as long
as the NB solution exists.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 4 can be used to further simplify the lower level problem (23). Substituting (21)
into the objective function of the sub-problem (23), the latter can be rewritten as
max
αi(k), k∈ΩN
log
(∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)Ri(k)−RNEi
)
−
∑
k∈ΩN
λ(k)αi(k)
subject to: 0 ≤ αi(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ ΩN ;
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)Ri(k) > R
NE
i (25)
where Ri(k) = log(1+ |Φii(k)|2pmaxi (k)/σ2i ) is the rate on frequency bin k for user i. The lower
level subproblems are solved distributively by the corresponding users.
The Hessian of the objective function of the problem (25) can be written as
∇2fi(αi) = −
(∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)Ri(k)−RNEi
)−2
rrT (26)
where r = [R1(1), . . . , R1(N), R2(1), . . . , R2(N), . . . , RM(1), . . . , RM(N)]T and αi = [αi(1), ...,
αi(N)]
T
. It is straightforward to see that ∇2fi(αi) is negative definite since Ri(k) > 0 (∀i ∈
ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN ). Thus, each Lagrange problem (25) is guaranteed to be strictly convex and a
unique solution exists. More importantly, the information required for solving the ith subproblem,
i.e., Ri(k) and RNEi , is local to user i.
A coordinator is needed to solve the higher level master problem. Since the overhead of the
information exchange and the amount of computations for (24) is insignificant, any user can act
as a coordinator or all users can serve as coordinators in a round-robin manner. The algorithm
for solving the dual problem is summarized in Table II. Then, the complexity of finding the
bargaining solution is determined by the complexity of the lower level subproblems (25) which
is O(N3).
Note that the coefficients λ(k) (k ∈ ΩN ) have specific physical meaning. Indeed, λ(k)
represents the risk that cooperation among users breaks up due to a conflict on sharing frequency
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TABLE II
DUAL DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM FOR NB.
1. The coordinator initializes λ = λ0 = [λ0(1), λ0(2), ..., λ0(N)]T and broadcasts it to all users.
2. Each user solves (25) according to the present value of λ and transmits its solutions for
αi(k), k ∈ ΩN to the coordinator.
3. The coordinator updates λ according to the gradient of the master problem (24) as λˆ(k) = [λ(k)
−δ(1− ∑
i∈ΩM
αi(k))]+ (∀k ∈ ΩN ) where (·)+ denotes the projection onto non-negative sub-space
and δ is the step length of the algorithm.
4. If |λˆ(k)− λ(k)| ≤ ξ (∀k ∈ ΩN ), stop; otherwise the coordinator broadcasts λˆ and go to step 2.
Here, ξ is the stopping threshold of the algorithm.
bin k. Thus, in the lower level subproblems, the objective for each user consists of two parts.
On one hand, a larger αi(k) is preferred to increase the total information rate of user i. On the
other hand, if αi(k) becomes too large, the cooperation may break up and the utility of user i
will return to the inferior competitive solution.
IV. COOPERATIVE PRECODING/RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAMES WITH SMCS AND TPCS
The following NB precoding/resource allocation problem with both SMCs and TPCs is con-
sidered
max
Fi,∀i∈ΩM
∏
i∈ΩM
(Ri(Fi,F−i)− R′i)
subject to: [FiFHi ]kk ≤ pmaxi (k), ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN ; Tr{FiFHi } ≤ Pmaxi , ∀i ∈ ΩM . (27)
Unlike the problem (11) considered in the previous section, the diagonal elements of the precod-
ing matrices Fi (∀i ∈ ΩM ) in (27) do not necessarily satisfy [Fi]k,k =
√
pmax(k) when frequency
bin k is allocated to user i because of the total power constraint. However, if the joint TDM/FDM
cooperation scheme is used, Theorem 1 applies, and Fi (∀i ∈ ΩM ) can be written as
Fi = diag(
√pi), ∀i ∈ ΩM . (28)
Using the same train of arguments as in the previous section, (27) can be simplified as
max
αi(k),pi, i∈ΩM ,k∈ΩN
∑
i∈ΩM
log(Ri − R′i)
subject to: 0≤αi(k)≤1, ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN ;
∑
i∈ΩM
αi(k)≤1, ∀k ∈ ΩN ; Ri>R′i, ∀i ∈ ΩM
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)pi(k) ≤ Pmaxi , ∀i ∈ ΩM ; pi(k) ≤ pmaxi (k), ∀i ∈ ΩM , ∀k ∈ ΩN
(29)
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where pi = [pi(1), pi(2), . . . , pi(N)] is the power allocation vector for user i, R′i is the dis-
agreement point for user i, and Ri =
∑
k∈ΩN
log(1 + |Φii(k)Fii(k)|2/σ2i ) =
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)log(1 +
|Φii(k)|2pi(k)/σ2i ) is the sum information rate that user i can obtain.
Unlike the problem (20) in the previous section, it can be seen that pi (i ∈ ΩM ) are also
optimization variables in (29). Moreover, (29) is non-convex. Indeed, the Hessian matrix Hfi of
fi(αi, pi) =
∑
k∈ΩM
αi(k)pi(k) can be written as
Hfi = ∇2fi(αi, pi) =

 0 I
I 0

 . (30)
Thus, Hfi (∀i ∈ ΩM) are orthogonal matrices, i.e., HfiHTfi = I (∀i ∈ ΩM ). The eigenvalues
of the orthogonal matrices can only be 1 or −1. Moreover, it is known that the summation of
all eigenvalues of Hfi equals Tr{Hfi} which is zero for any i. Therefore, Hfi (∀i ∈ ΩM ) must
have equal number of eigenvalues 1 and −1. The latter means that Hfi (∀i ∈ ΩM ) are indefinite.
Thus, the constraints
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)pi(k) ≤ Pmaxi (∀i ∈ ΩM ) are non-convex and the non-convexity
of the optimization problem (29) follows.
In the following studies, the two-user case is considered and the disagreement point is chosen
at the origin of the rate region, i.e., R′i = 0 (∀i ∈ ΩM ), instead of the NE point since finding
the NE solution, in this case, is itself a complicated problem.
A. Bandwidth-dominant and power-dominant systems
Finding the TDM/FDM-based NB solution of the problem (29) requires joint power and
frequency bin allocation for each user, and the resulting complexity of the two-user game can be
unacceptably high. Moreover, the TDM/FDM-based cooperation can be inefficient in some cases
when TPCs are present. To overcome these problems, we categorize systems into two types and
deal with each type separately. Toward this end, two definitions need to be given first.
Definition 1: A point x is Pareto-optimal in space S if and only if y = x for all y satisfying
y  x in S.
A Pareto-optimal point corresponds to an efficient allocation of system resources. The NB
solution is one of the Pareto-optimal points in a utility space (rate region).
For the two-user cooperative game, there is a well known algorithm for obtaining the
TDM/FDM-based NB solution if only SMCs are imposed on the users [13], [34]. According
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to this algorithm, the frequency bins are first arranged such that R1(k)/R2(k) ≥ R1(j)/R2(j)
(∀j, k ∈ ΩN ) if k < j, where Ri(k) is the rate that user i can achieve on frequency bin k by
using pmaxi (k) and allowing no interference from other users. Given any integer kˆ ∈ ΩN , let
α1(k) = 1, α2(k) = 0, p1(k) = p
max
1 (k), p2(k) = 0, ∀k < kˆ
α1(k) = 0, α2(k) = 1, p1(k) = 0, p2(k) = p
max
2 (k), ∀k > kˆ
α1(kˆ) = β, α2(kˆ) = 1− β, p1(kˆ) = pmax1 (kˆ), p2(kˆ) = pmax2 (kˆ). (31)
Then the point R = [R1, R2] is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal in the rate region for any
0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Varying kˆ and β, all Pareto-optimal points can be obtained including the NB
solution of the game with only SMCs.
Definition 2: All Pareto-optimal points in a convex space S form the Pareto-boundary of S.
The NB solution for the two-user cooperative precoding/resource allocation game with only
SMCs can be found by searching on the Pareto-boundary instead of the entire utility space of
the game. The algorithm of [13] is based on the principle that frequency bins which are “better”
for a certain user should be allocated to this user prior to the other frequency bins which are
“inferior”. However, this principle may fail and lead to highly inefficient solutions if TPCs are
also imposed.
Consider the following simple example. Assume that there are four frequency bins and [R1(k),
R2(k)] are [0.5, 0.1] for k = 1, [2, 1] for k = 2, [1, 3] for k = 3, and [0.3, 1] for k = 4.
Also assume that pmaxi = [1, 1, 1, 1] and Pmaxi = 1.5 for both users. Then according to the
aforementioned principle, the following resource allocation can be obtained α1(1) = α2(4) =
1, α1(2) = α2(3) = 0.5, α1(3) = α1(4) = α2(1) = α2(2) = 0 and p1(1) = p1(2) = p2(3) =
p2(4) = 1, p1(3) = p1(4) = p2(1) = p2(2) = 0. Note that the TPCs
∑
k∈ΩN
αi(k)pi(k) ≤ Pmaxi (i ∈
Ω2) are used to derive the TDM/FDM coefficients α1(2) = (Pmax1 −pmax1 (1)α1(1))/pmax1 (2) = 0.5
and α2(3) = (Pmax2 −pmax2 (4)α2(4))/pmax2 (3) = 0.5. The resulting rates are R1 = 1.5 and R2 = 2.5,
and the point (1.5, 2.5) is obviously not Pareto-optimal. For example, the strategies according to
which frequency bin 2 is allocated to user 1 and frequency bin 3 is allocated to user 2 for the
whole time provide higher rates than the allocation performed according to the aforementioned
principle. It is because the principle in [13] considers only comparative advantages between the
users, but not the absolute advantages.
It follows from the above discussion that the presence of TPCs renders a different bargaining
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problem since there is a need to coordinate between the power allocation and the frequency bin
allocation. Therefore, a different approach has to be developed. Toward this end, note that we
can first consider the solutions for the bargaining game with only SMCs (denoted as game G1),
and then add TPCs to the game (denoted as game G2).
Observation 1: TPCs do not enlarge the utility space of the game. The Pareto-optimal solutions
for game G1 are also Pareto-optimal for game G2 if they are achievable.
Denote the Pareto-boundary of the TDM/FDM utility space of game G1 as P . Then, the
following proposition is in order.
Theorem 5: Assume that the frequency bins are ordered such that R1(k)/R2(k) ≥ R1(j)/R2(j)
(k, j ∈ ΩN ) if k < j. A non-empty subset P can be achieved in game G2 under both SMCs and
TPCs if and only if there exist 1 ≤ k˜ ≤ N and 0 ≤ α˜ ≤ 1 such that
Pmax1 −
k˜−1∑
k=1
pmax1 (k)
pmax1 (k˜)
≥ α˜ ≥
N∑
k=k˜
pmax2 (k)− Pmax2
pmax2 (k˜)
. (32)
Proof: See Appendix C.
According to (32), all multi-user systems can be categorized into bandwidth- and power-
dominant. If condition (32) is satisfied, the system is bandwidth-dominant and the rates of
both users can increase simultaneously only if new frequency bins are added into the system.
Otherwise, the system is power-dominant and the rates of both users can increase simultaneously
only when TPCs of the users are relaxed.
Observation 2: Beginning as a bandwidth-dominant, a multi-user system gradually changes
towards a power-dominant as the number of available frequency bins increases.
B. Bandwidth-dominant systems: TDM/FDM based bargaining
In the bandwidth-dominant systems, the TDM/FDM-based cooperation is efficient in the sense
that a non-empty subset P can be achieved in game G2. Denote the Pareto-boundary of the
TDM/FDM utility space of G2 as P2. Then, for the bandwidth-dominant systems, the bargaining
can be restricted in the set P ′ = P2∩P only. The resulted NB solution, denoted as S ′NB , can be
sub-optimal as compared to the optimal solution of the non-convex optimization problem (29). It
is because the power allocation (which is not the dominant factor in this case) is not optimized
jointly with frequency bins allocation.
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Denote the optimal NB solution of game G2 as SoptNB. Also denote the TDM/FDM utility
spaces of games G1 and G2 as U1 and U2, respectively. Then, the following theorem regarding
the optimality of S ′NB is in order.
Theorem 6: S ′NB = S
opt
NB if SoptNB ∈ P ′. If S ′NB 6= SoptNB , then SoptNB /∈ P but S ′NB ∈ P , which
means that SoptNB is not Pareto-optimal in U1 but S ′NB is Pareto-optimal in U1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 6 leads to the following two conclusions about the optimality of S ′NB in the bandwidth-
dominant systems: (i) S ′NB can be identical to the optimal TDM/FDM based NB solution;
(ii) S ′NB is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal in U1 (which is larger than U2) even if the optimal
NB solution is not Pareto-optimal.
C. Power-dominant systems: FDM/sampled time sharing-based bargaining
Let us now consider the case of power-dominant systems. The example given in Subsec-
tion IV-A is, in fact, an example of a power-dominant system. From this example, we can make
the following observation.
Observation 3: The use of the maximum allowed power on all allocated frequency bins
generally results in a non-optimal solution for game G2.
To verify this observation, let us denote the set of all frequency bins as B, the subset of
frequency bins which user 1 occupies using the maximum allowed power as Bmax1 , the set of
frequency bins which user 2 occupies using the maximum allowed power as Bmax2 . Then, user 1
may improve its rate by water-filling on B−Bmax2 instead of using the maximum allowed power
on Bmax1 , while the rate of user 2 can be kept the same. Here B − Bmax2 denotes the difference
between sets B and Bmax2 , and the general term water-filling is used to represent the specific
meaning of finding the solution of the following convex problem
max
pi(j), j∈ΩN
∑
j∈ΩN
log(1 + εi(j)pi(j)) subject to:
∑
j∈ΩN
pi(j) = P
max
i ; pi(j) ≤ pmaxi (j), ∀j ∈ ΩN
(33)
which is a single-user multi-channel power allocation problem with constant εi(j) = |[Φii]jj|2/σ2i
being a measure of the channel j for user i, which depends on the channel gain and channel
noise.
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TABLE III
ALGORITHM FOR THE POWER-DOMINANT SYSTEMS.
1. Both users i ∈ Ω2 perform the water-filling (33) on B and obtain two sets of frequency bins B˜i (i ∈ Ω2).
Then, Bc = B˜1
T
B˜2 is the set of frequency bins under competition.
2. In the first round of this step, user 1 is allocated the set of frequency bins B˜1 and user 2 performs water-filling
on B − B˜1. In round j (j goes from 2 to L = |Bc| where |Bc| denotes the cardinality of the set Bc), user 1
selects a subset, denoted as Bjs , of j−1 frequency bins with smallest channel gains from the set Bc and performs
water-filling on B−Bjs. Then, user 2 performs water-filling on the remaining frequency bins. After the Lth round,
L points in the utility space are obtained.
3. Perform L rounds of the aforementioned step 2 for user 2 starting from the state that user 2 is allocated the
set of frequency bins B˜2 and user 1 performs water-filling on B− B˜2. Obtain other L points in the utility space.
4. Denote the set of 2L points obtained in steps 2 and 3 as T . Find the Pareto-boundary PT of ST where ST
is the minimum convex space containing T .
5. Bargain on PT and obtain the solution S′′NB .
Observation 3 suggests that the power-dominant games have to be played based on a different
manner of cooperation from the TDM/FDM. A reasonable choice of the manner of cooperation
is the FDM/time sharing (TS), which considers time sharing between points corresponding to
different FDM based frequency bin allocation schemes. Then the power allocation, which is
the dominant problem in this case, is based on the water-filling problem (33). However, the
complexity of finding the FDM/TS based NB solution is high, especially when the number of
frequency bins is large. To obtain the FDM/TS-based NB solution, the water-filling should first
be performed for all 2N possible frequency bin allocations between the users, and the resulted
2N points in the utility space should be recorded. Then the TS is used to obtain a minimum
convex space containing all these points and the NB solution is derived. The complexity of the
TS is then O(4N), which is exponential in the number of frequency bins.
To reduce the complexity, we consider a simplified version of the FDM/TS, which is the
FDM/sampled time sharing (STS). The proposed FDM/STS scheme finds the optimal FDM/STS
based NB solution according to the algorithm described in Table III.
Let WF i(X ) denotes the water-filling operator for user i on the set of frequency bins X .
It returns the maximum rate that user i can obtain by optimizing its power allocation on X .
Let also the vector of rates Ropt corresponding to the FDM/TS-based NB solution SoptNB be
obtained by time sharing of two points (Ropt11 , R
opt1
2 ) and (R
opt2
1 , R
opt2
2 ) in the utility space
of game G2, and the time sharing coefficients are λ and 1 − λ, respectively, that is, Ropt =
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TABLE IV
THE OVERALL ALGORITHM FOR THE TWO-USER NB GAME WITH SMCS AND TPCS.
1. Check the condition (32): If it is satisfied, go to step 2, otherwise, go to step 3.
2. System is bandwidth-dominant: Search on the Pareto-boundary P ′, and return the solution S′
NB
.
3. System is power-dominant: Derive B˜1, B˜2, and Bc. Play the 2L rounds and obtain T and PT .
Search on PT , and return the solution S′′NB .
(λRopt11 + (1 − λ)Ropt21 , λRopt12 + (1 − λ)Ropt22 ). Denote the sets of frequency bins allocated
to the users in the points (Ropt11 , R
opt1
2 ) and (R
opt2
1 , R
opt2
2 ) as (Bopt11 , Bopt12 ) and (Bopt21 , Bopt22 ),
correspondingly. Then, the following theorem is in order.
Theorem 7: The FDM/STS based NB solution S ′′NB obtained using the algorithm in Table III
can be identical to the FDM/TS based NB solution SoptNB . If they are not identical, the difference
d between the logarithm of the NF for SoptNB and the logarithm of the NF for S ′′NB is bounded
by
d < min
(
log
( WF 2(Bopt22 )
WF 2(B − B˜2)
)
, log
( WF1(Bopt11 )
WF1(B − B˜1)
))
. (34)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding S ′′NB in the power-dominant systems:
(i) S ′′NB is the optimal FDM/STS based NB solution. Thus, it is a Pareto-optimal solution in the
FDM/STS utility space; (ii) S ′′NB can be identical to SoptNB; (iii) The efficiency of S ′′NB depends
on the ratios ω1 and ω2, where ωi =WF i(Bopti )/WF i(B − B˜i).
D. The two-user algorithm
The overall algorithm, which combines both the bandwidth-dominant and power-dominant
cases, for the two-user cooperative NB game is given in Table IV.
In the bandwidth-dominant case, the complexity of searching on P ′ is O(N). In the power-
dominant case, the complexity of the algorithm in Table III is determined by the time sharing
part, which is O(L2), i.e., the complexity reduction as compared to O(4N) for the optimal
FDM/TS based solution (where the time consumed on water-filling is neglected in both cases)
is dramatically significant, especially for large N .
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Cooperative precoding/resource allocation games with SMCs
In the first example, we assume that two users share four available frequency bins. The noise
power σ2 is 0.01 for both users on all frequency bins. The channel gains of the desired channels
Φ11 and Φ22 are generated as Rayleigh random variables with mean 1. The channel gains of the
interference channels Φ12 and Φ21 are generated as Rayleigh random variables with means 0.7
and 0.2, respectively. The elements of the spectral mask vector pmax are also Rayleigh random
variables with mean 1.
In Fig. 1, the NB solution computed according to Theorem 2 is shown together with the
NE solution. The boundary of the TDM/FDM rate region is also included in the figure. Fig. 2
displays the values of the logarithm of the NF under different TDM/FDM frequency bin allocation
schemes. In this figure, k is the frequency bin being shared and α is the fraction of time that
user 1 uses the frequency bin k. It can be seen in Fig. 1 that the NB solution lies on the boundary
of the TDM/FDM rate region and provides significantly larger rates to both users than the NE
solution. Moreover, the NB solution is fair to both users. It can be also seen in Fig. 2 that the
largest value of the logarithm of the NF corresponds to the optimal scheme that provides the
NB solution.
In the second example, the distributed algorithm for the M-user game developed in Sec-
tion III-C is tested. It is assumed that four users share six frequency bins. As in the previous
example, channel gains of the desired and interference channels are generated as Rayleigh random
variables with means 1 and 0.2, respectively. The elements of the spectral mask vector pmax are
also Rayleigh random variables with mean 1. The step length δ = 0.2 (if different values are
not specified) and stopping threshold ξ = 10−5 are selected.
The iterations of the NB process are shown in Fig. 3. The four curves on the upper side of the
figure show the instantaneous information rates that the corresponding users can achieve, and the
curve at the bottom shows the corresponding values of the logarithm of the NF. The NB and NE
solutions and the comparison between them in terms of the percentage of improvement provided
by the NB solution versus the NE solution are shown in Table V for one of the runs. It can be
seen from Fig. 3 and Table V that all users obtain supplementary benefit from cooperation. The
corresponding final allocation of time portions on each frequency bin for each user is shown in
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TABLE V
COMPARISONS BETWEEN NE AND NB
User NE Solution NB solution Increased by
1 1.1296 2.2707 101.02%
2 1.4014 2.4906 77.72%
3 1.2952 2.3992 85.24%
4 1.6957 2.4175 42.56%
Fig. 4. It can be seen that frequency bins 1, 2, 3, and 4 are occupied exclusively by users 3, 4,
1, and 2, respectively, while frequency bins 5 and 6 are shared by users 1 and 4, and users 2
and 3, respectively.
Fig. 5 depicts the effect of the step length on the convergence speed of the algorithm. With the
step lengths δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, the corresponding logarithm of NF is shown in each sub-figure.
It can be seen that the algorithm is time-efficient with a good choice of the step length.
B. Cooperative precoding/resourse allocation games with SMCs and TPCs
Fig. 6 shows the system classification according to Theorem 5 versus the total power limits
and the number of frequency bins for the two-user system. The total power limits of the
users Pmax1 and Pmax2 are equal and vary from 1 to 51. The number of frequency bins N
increases from 1 to 256. The desired channel gains are randomly generated using Rayleigh
distribution with mean 1, and the users do not interfere with each other due to the orthogonal
signaling assumption. The power limits on different frequency bins pmaxi (k) (∀i ∈ Ω2, ∀k ∈ ΩN )
are uniformly distributed in the interval [1.8, 2.2]. The frequency bins are sorted such that
R1(k)/R2(k) ≥ R1(j)/R2(j) (k, j ∈ ΩN ) if k < j. Following the comparative advantage
based principle introduced in Section IV-A, the maximum number of frequency bins ki that
user i can cover is k1 = {max t1|t1 ∈ ΩN ,
∑t1
k=1 p
max
1 (k) ≤ P1} for user 1 and k2 =
{max t2|t2 ∈ ΩN ,
∑N
k=N−t2+1
pmax2 (k) ≤ P2} for user 2. The total normalized bandwidth bi
(with the bandwidth of each frequency bin normalized to 1) that user i can cover is then b1 = k1+(
P1 −
∑k1
k=1 p
max
1 (k)
)
/pmax1 (k1+1) for user 1 and b2 = k2+
(
P2 −
∑N
k=N−k2+1
pmax2 (k)
)
/pmax2 (N−
k2) for user 2. Then the variable τ = 1−(b1+b2)/N stands for the system property characteristic
according to Theorem 5. The system is bandwidth-dominant if −1 ≤ τ ≤ 0 and is power-
dominant if 0 < τ < 1. It can be seen from the figure that the system changes gradually from
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bandwidth- to power-dominant when new frequency bins are added into the system, while it
changes gradually from power- to bandwidth-dominant when the total power limits of the users
are relaxed.
In our last example, the power-dominant two-user system is considered.4 The number of
frequency bins varies from 4 to 9 (50 runs for each case). The total power limits of the users are
set as Pi = 2 (i ∈ Ω2) for each user, and the power limits on different frequency bins are set to
1 + x(k) where x(k) is a uniform random variable in the interval [0.2, 0.25]. It guarantees that
the system is power-dominant. The channel gains on all frequency bins are randomly generated
for both users using Rayleigh distribution with mean 1.
Fig. 7 shows the FDM/TS- and FDM/STS-based NB solutions SoptNB and S ′′NB , respectively,
in 300 simulation runs. It can be seen in the figure that S ′′NB is identical to S
opt
NB for most of
the cases. Moreover, although the distance between S ′′NB and S
opt
NB for some cases may appear
relatively large in the utility space, the difference between the values of the logarithm of their
NF are small as shown in Fig. 8. Particularly, Fig. 8 depicts the logarithm of the NF for SoptNB and
S ′′NB (denoted as NFopt and NF′, respectively) versus the number of frequency bins N when the
total power limits Pmaxi (i ∈ Ω2) are set to 1.5, 2, or 2.5. Every point in the figure is averaged
over 50 runs. It can be seen from Fig. 8 that the gap between NFopt and NF′ is very small, if it
is not zero.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative NB-based precoding/resource allocation strategies on FSFCs are studied under
SMCs and optionally TPCs. First, it is shown that the optimal precoding matrices adopt a
strictly diagonal structure and the NB-based precoding game is equivalent to a corresponding
resource allocation game if the users are not allowed to interfere with each other, i.e., orthogonal
signaling is used. The use of orthogonal signaling is practically important since it significantly
simplifies transceiver design and allows for significant reduction of the system overhead during
user cooperation. Second, it is shown that the NB solution of the cooperative precoding/resource
allocation game with only SMCs can be obtained efficiently in a distributed manner (a simple
4Note that for the bandwidth-dominant systems, the algorithm for finding the NB solution inherits the algorithm for finding
the optimal TDM/FDM based NB solution in the precoding games without TPCs which is already studied above.
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coordinator is required) with inevitable information exchanges among users. The developed two-
level user cooperation procedure avoids a large system overhead by enabling users to perform
most of the computations individually using their local information. Third, it is shown that the
cooperative NB-based precoding/resource allocation game with both SMCs and TPCs is non-
convex and finding its optimal solution requires joint optimization of the frequency bins (which is
the public resource) and each user’s transmit power (which is the individual resource) allocations.
The complexity of finding the optimal solution is unacceptably high in this case. Therefore, it is
proposed to categorize all multi-user systems into bandwidth- and power-dominant depending on
the bottleneck resource in the system. For different classes of the systems, the algorithms based
on different manners of cooperation are developed. While the TDM/FDM based cooperation
is still efficient for the bandwidth dominant systems, the TDM/STS cooperation is used for
the power-dominant systems. The above classification of the multi-user systems guarantees that
the solutions obtained by the algorithms corresponding to each category are Pareto-optimal and
can be even identical to the optimal solutions, while the algorithm complexity is significantly
reduced. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative solutions
and their superiority to the NE solutions.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1 IN SECTION II
The noise covariance in (3) is equivalent to R−i = σ2i I when the cooperation among users
is based on orthogonal signaling such as, for example, TDM for FFCs or joint TDM/FDM for
FSFCs.5 Thus, Ri(Fi,F−i) is simplified to
Ri = log
(
det
(
I + 1
σ2i
FHi ΦHiiΦiiFi
))
. (35)
The Hadamard’s inequality (det(A) ≤ ∏i aii for a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix A)
suggests that the determinant in (35) is maximized when Fi is diagonal. Moreover, the power
constraints given in (6) and (7) are irrelevant to the non-diagonal elements of Fi. Therefore, the
optimal precoding matrices must be diagonal. 
5It can be, however, any other orthogonal signaling scheme.
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APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREMS 2 AND 4 IN SECTION III
Proof of Theorem 2
As follows from Theorem 1, the optimal Fl1 and Fl2 (l ∈ Ω2) are diagonal. The three conditions
in (13) are based on the fact that the joint TDM/FDM is used. First, consider the FDM part.
Given any division of the frequency bins, both users will use maximum allowed power on all
frequency bins allocated to them. Thus, the first condition in (13) follows.
The second condition in (13) is based on the fact that only one user is allowed on any given
frequency bin at any time. Thus, there must be a user which allocates zero power on any given
frequency bin at any time.
The third condition in (13) is based on the fact that the NB solution can be obtained by
sharing at most a single frequency bin between both users.6 The proof of the latter fact can be
given by contradiction using the optimality of the NB solution.
Assume that the NB solution can be obtained only by sharing two or more frequency bins
between both users and consider the case when two frequency bins m and n are shared. In the
sharing scheme, user 2 uses a fraction α1 of the time in frequency bin m and a fraction α2
of the time in frequency bin n. Let Ri(m) and Ri(n) be the rates that user i can obtain by
exclusively using frequency bins m and n, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that R2(m)/R1(m) ≥ R2(n)/R1(n). Then either of the following cases must happen: (i) if
α1R2(m)+α2R2(n) ≥ R2(m), there exists γ ∈ [0, 1) such that α1R2(m)+α2R2(n) = R2(m)+
γR2(n); (ii) if α1R2(m) + α2R2(n) < R2(m), there exists γ ∈ [0, 1) such that α1R2(m) +
α2R2(n) = γR2(m).
Case (i) corresponds to the sharing scheme according to which only frequency bin n is shared
between both users, and user 2 exploits a fraction γ of time on frequency bin n. According to
this new sharing scheme, user 2 obtains the same rate on frequency bins m and n as that in the
original scheme. Then the rate that user 1 can obtain on frequency bins m and n in the new
scheme is
(1−γ)R1(n) =
(
1− (α1−1)R2(m)+α2R2(n)
R2(n)
)
R1(n)=(1−α1)R1(n)R2(m)
R2(n)
+(1−α2)R1(n)
≥ (1−α1)R1(m)+(1−α2)R1(n). (36)
6Note that a similar observation has been made in [14], but here we give a different much simpler proof.
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The last inequality follows from the assumption that R2(m)/R1(m) ≥ R2(n)/R1(n). It can be
seen from (36) that the rate that user 1 can obtain using the new sharing scheme is equal to or
larger than that in the original scheme. This contradicts the assumption that the NB solution can
be achieved only by sharing of two frequency bins between both users.
A similar result can be derived for Case (ii). Moreover, when more than two frequency bins
are shared, the above proof can be used iteratively to obtain the same result. Therefore, the
optimal solution can be obtained by sharing at most a single frequency bin between both users.
Thus, F1i (i ∈ Ω2) can be obtained by adding/deleting a single diagonal element of F2i (i ∈ Ω2)
and the third condition in (13) follows. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Since the constraints of the problem (20) are all linear, the Slater’s condition reduces to two
parts with the first part requiring that the feasible domain of f =
∑
i
log(Ri−RNEi ) be open and
the second part requiring that the feasible domain of the whole problem be non-empty.
It is straightforward to verify that the first part is satisfied. The second part is equivalent to
the requirement of the existence of the NB solution. This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREMS 5–7 IN SECTION IV
Proof of Theorem 5
First note that in game G1 any resource allocation scheme satisfying (31) results in a Pareto-
optimal point in the utility space, and vice versa. Thus, the statement of the theorem is equivalent
to the statement that (32) is the sufficient and necessary condition to guarantee that at least one
set of {kˆ, β} satisfies the conditions (31). To prove the sufficiency, let (32) is satisfied, kˆ = k˜, and
β = α˜ in (31). Then the resulting total powers used by the users are P ′1 =
k˜−1∑
k=1
pmax1 (k)+ α˜p
max
1 (k˜)
for user 1 and P ′2 =
N∑
k=k˜+1
pmax2 (k)+(1− α˜)pmax2 (k˜) for user 2. Using (32), it is easy to verify that
Pmax1 ≥ P ′1 and Pmax2 ≥ P ′2. Therefore, the sufficiency is proved. The necessity can be proved
similarly using contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 6
The first part of the theorem follows from the independence on irrelevant alternatives property
of the NB [35]. This property states that bargaining in a convex subset which contains the NB
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solution of the original set results in the same NB solution. Thus, it is clear that if S ′NB 6= SoptNB ,
then SoptNB /∈ P ′. Since P ′ is the achievable subset of P in game G2, it is impossible that SoptNB ∈ P
and SoptNB /∈ P ′ simultaneously. Thus, if SoptNB /∈ P ′, then SoptNB /∈ P as well. This completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 7
Let Ropt11 > R
opt2
1 . Then R
opt1
2 < R
opt2
2 due to the Pareto-optimality. Let also R1 = (R11, R12)
and R2 = (R21, R22) be two points generated in steps 2 and 3 of the algorithm summarized in
Table III such that R11 ≥ Ropt11 and R22 ≥ Ropt22 . Denote the sets of frequency bins allocated to
the users in the points R1 and R2 as (B11,B12) and (B21,B22), respectively. Recalling that R′i = 0
(∀i ∈ Ω2), i.e., the disagreement point is the origin, the difference between the logarithm of the
NF for Ropt and the logarithm of the NF for R1 can be obtained as
d1 = log
(
λRopt11 +(1−λ)Ropt21
)
+log
(
λRopt12 +(1−λ)Ropt22
)−log(R11)−log(R12)
= log
(
λ
Ropt11
R11
+ (1− λ)R
opt2
1
R11
)
+ log
(
λ
Ropt12
R12
+ (1− λ)R
opt2
2
R12
)
< log
(
λ
Ropt11
R11
+ (1− λ)R
opt1
1
R11
)
+ log
(
λ
Ropt22
R12
+ (1− λ)R
opt2
2
R12
)
≤ log
(
λ
Ropt22
R12
+ (1− λ)R
opt2
2
R12
)
= log
(
Ropt22
R12
)
= log
( WF 2(Bopt22 )
WF2(B − Bj1)
)
. (37)
where the inequalities hold because log
(
λRopt11 + (1− λ)Ropt21
)
+log
(
λRopt12 + (1− λ)Ropt22
)−
log(R11) − log(R12) > 0, Ropt11 > Ropt21 , Ropt12 < Ropt22 , and R11 > Ropt11 , and the last equality is
obtained by substituting the notations Ropt22 = WF2(Bopt22 ) and R12 = WF2(B − Bj1). Here
1 ≤ j ≤ L stands for the index of the round in which R12 is obtained by user 2.
Furthermore, using the fact that WF2(B − Bj1) ≥ WF2(B − B˜2), (37) can be simplified as
d1 < log
( WF2(Bopt22 )
WF2(B − B˜2)
)
. (38)
It can be derived in a similar way that the difference d2 between the logarithm of the NF for
Ropt and the logarithm of the NF for R2 obeys the following inequality
d2 < log
( WF1(Bopt11 )
WF1(B − B˜1)
)
. (39)
Finally, note that neither R1 nor R2 have been assumed to be the rates corresponding to the
optimal FDM/STS-based NB solution. Indeed, R1 and R2 are just two of 2L points generated
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in steps 2 and 3 of the algorithm summarized in Table III, respectively. Thus, the rates corre-
sponding to the actual solution returned by the algorithm are expected to be superior to the rates
corresponding to the points R1 and R2, or even equal to the rates in the optimal solution Ropt.7
Therefore, d ≤ min(d1, d2) and d can be equal to zero. This completes the proof. 
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Fig. 1. The FDM/TDM rate region and the NE and NB solutions on the frequency selective channel.
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Fig. 2. The logarithm of the NF under different FDM/TDM frequency bin allocation schemes.
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Fig. 3. Instantaneous information rates and the corresponding logarithm of NF versus number of iterations.
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Fig. 4. Allocations of time portions on frequency bins {αi(k)}.
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
32
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Number of iterations
lo
g(N
F)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Number of iterations
lo
g(N
F)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Number of iterations
lo
g(N
F)
 
 
δ=0.3
δ=0.2
δ=0.1
Fig. 5. The logarithm of the NF versus number of iterations under different step lengths, δ ∈ {0.3, 0.2, 0.1}.
Fig. 6. System classification versus total power limits and number of frequency bins.
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